Veterans Exposed to Deadly Chemicals

The government is not required to notify veterans and their dependents of exposure to toxic chemicals. Most veterans have no way to "connect the dots" of their illnesses to military service. Congress passed legislation recently to require the Navy to notify Camp Lejeune veterans, dependents, and civilan workers of contamination of base wells.

There is no legal requirement for the Department of Defense to notify veterans and their dependents of the risk of exposure to toxic chemicals and the health effects.

The Air Force reported in 2003 that the Defense Department had over 1,400 military sites contaminated with trichloroethylene (TCE).

Former Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) El Toro, once the premier Marine Corps air base, is one of the sites contaminated with TCE. In June 2007, The Marine Corps Times reported 22 bases with TCE water contaminations, including Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, Barstow, CA, March Air Force Base, Riverside, CA and Mather Air Force Base, Mather, CA. http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/06/marine_water_list_070625/

El Toro veterans and their dependents are at risk for exposure to TCE, tetrachloroethylene (PCE) and other contaminants found in the soil and groundwater of the former base. http://www.salem-news.com/articles/august082008/tce_interview_7-8-08.php

A number of El Toro veterans and dependents report illnesses linked to TCE exposure. Exposure to TCE can occur from ingestion (drinking contaminated water), dermal contact, and inhalation.

Most El Toro veterans and their dependents have no idea of their risk of exposure to toxic chemicals from living and working on the base. Most do not live in nearby Orange County or in California and would never have heard that El Toro was placed on the EPA Superfund list. El Toro was commissioned in March 1943 and closed in July 1999. Over these 56 years, thousands of Marines were stationed at this southern California oasis. Those that are still alive are geographically dispersed over the entire country.

TCE contamination of the drinking water at Camp Lejeune, another Marine Corps base, required special legislation for the Navy and Marine Corps to notify Camp Lejeune veterans, dependents, and civilian workers.

The defense authorization bill for 2008 included a provision supported by Senator Elizabeth Dole of North Carolina to “require the Secretary of the Navy to directly notify Marines, dependents and civilian employees who were assigned at Camp Lejeune between 1958 and 1987 that they were exposed to harmful chemicals in the installation’s water system. The last contaminated wells were closed in 1987, but the U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) has found that babies exposed in utero to the drinking water developed leukemia and other cancers, as well as birth defects, such as spina bifida and cleft palate.” http://dole.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=66232911-2557-41a8-a0b3-c0838a0eed14&Month=12&Year=2007

There shouldn’t be a need for special legislation for the government to do the right thing.

Earlier this month, a few El Toro veterans started to collect signatures for a petition to President Elect Obama to require the Defense Department to notify Marine and Navy veterans and their dependents of the risk of exposure and health effects to toxic chemicals from the base--an EPA Superfund site in the 1990s and closed in 1999.

As one of these veterans, I believe that government has a moral obligation to notify veterans and dependents of their possible exposure to toxic chemicals. Congress shouldn’t have to pass legislation to notify veterans and dependents. It’s just the right thing to do.
http://www.thepetitionsite.com/takeaction/671058942

The Agency for Toxic Disease and Substances (ATSDR), responsible for public health assessments of EPA Superfund sites, reported that TCE and PCE are highly toxic and if not handled and disposed of properly can cause nervous system effects, kidney, liver and lung damage, abnormal heartbeat, coma, and possibly death. Occupational exposure to TCE also has been associated with adult cancers such as kidney cancer, liver and biliary cancer, and non-Hodgkin lymphoma. TCE in drinking water has been linked to childhood leukemia. http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.061207.Sinks-Testimony.pdf

Waits & Luxemburg, P.C., a national law firm, advertises on the internet for civilians affected by El Toro's toxic pollution. The Feres doctrine—resulting from a 1950 Supreme Court decision—prevents veterans from filing tort suits against the government for service connected injuries.
http://www.weitzlux.com/environmentallawsuit/california/eltoromarinecorpsa_145454.html

The reality is that unless the veterans or the dependents know of the contaminants and the health effects of exposure, it’s very unlikely that they will ever “connect the dots of their illnesses” to military service. Unlike the auto executives who flew into Washington last week asking for money to bail out their companies, most veterans and dependents are not interested in getting on the government’s dole. But, it sure would be helpful to them and their doctors to know that the cause of their illness was from chemical exposure.

Rationalization
By Carol Davis
http://www.watersurvivors.com/

Remembering my days in college, I think about the humanities classes I took. I remember the psychology classes, the sociology classes and the ethics classes. In psychology I learned about something called rationalization. If memory serves me correctly, rationalization is a defense mechanism, used by the brain, to protect the mind from the bad things in life. An example would be, lets say you ran over the neighbor’s geriatric cat, in your neighbor‘s driveway. Your rationalization may be any thought from, “The stupid cat shouldn’t have been in the driveway.” “The neighbor should have kept the cat in the house, he knew I was coming over.” “The cat’s better off anyway, it was so old and sick.” The point is that you liked the cat and are sorry for running over it. Your mind must think other things to keep from being crushed by what has happened. That’s rationalization. Humans are capable of rationalizing anything. They often do.

I look at sociology as the study of the dynamics of psychology in group form. Groups of people reinforce the rationalizations of the individuals in the group, if the group has intentionally or unintentionally done something terrible. Let’s say that a nation has contaminated families (military and civilian support personnel) who have historically defended that nation. The rationalizations may range from, “Live by the sword, die by the sword.” “They knew, when they joined the military that something bad could happen to them.” “Look at veterans, they’re an odd, often disabled, often different bunch of misfits.” The implication is that the veterans got what they deserve. The fact that veterans are often different only reinforces the “group think” (rationalization) which makes the nation feel sure that it has done the right thing with regards to the veterans. The fact that there’s an agency called the Veteran’s Administration, reinforces the idea that the veterans have gotten what they deserve. The fact that there are Senate and House Committees on Veteran’s Affairs, makes everyone feel sure that the veterans have gotten what they deserve. After all, there are very important people who are supposed to see to it that veterans get what they deserve. The nation can then wash its hands of the veterans who cared enough about the nation to serve in the military. The nation can wash its hands of the veterans who cared enough to protect the lives and wellbeing of the individuals in that nation. Its all a very nice package which allows the nation to function, despite the fact that patriotic families have been grievously harmed. That’s rationalization on a massive social scale. That’s “group think” at its worst. As you see, nations, even the best of them, can and do rationalize anything, no matter how horrible. The fact that so many have participated in the rationalization is all the evidence which is needed to convince those involved that they have done the right thing. Actual right and wrong have little to do with the outcome. The day to day struggles, the life and death struggles of the victims have little to do with the rationalization. The massive scale of the rationalization is what determines the final outcome.

Rationalization is a reality in the minds of individuals and societies. The question is not, “Do people rationalize?” or “Do nations rationalize? The question is, “If the rationalization has allowed ongoing, grievous harm to be visited upon people, should the situation be corrected to the extent possible?”

I’ve always considered ethics to be the study of the rightness or wrongness of an event or action. Let’s call it the study of , “Should we do it?” If a nation has contaminated patriotic families, in THE WORST CONTAMINATION OF A PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY IN U.S. HISTORY, should the nation turn its back on those who have been contaminated? Should the nation label the victims of contamination as odd, different, disabled or any other unsavory term? Should the nation allow any one of those odd, different or disabled patriots to live under a bridge? Should a nation profit from its own poison? Having contaminated its patriots and caused damage to their nervous systems, is the nation responsible for the sometimes odd behavior of the patriots? If contamination causes nerve damage and the nerves are attached to the brain and the brain controls behavior, can we blame the contaminated for being different? Should a nation contaminate patriots, deny those patriots appropriate care and rush off in pursuit of the dream the patriots defended? Should a nation deny the dream to those who defended it? Should a nation cannibalize its patriots in such a way?

I would guess that patriots expect that bad things may happen to them in a battlefield situation. I say that the patriots have a reasonable expectation that the water they are provided, should be contaminant free. They have a reasonable expectation that the water provided for their wives and children, should be contaminant free.

The ethical quagmire created by Camp Lejeune is one with which this nation will struggle for generations! Is it ethical for the Department of the Navy, the CDC and the State of North Carolina to enter into an agreement concerning the contamination at Camp Lejeune, when it impacts the lives of patriots? Is it ethical for those bureaucracies to make agreements which impact the lives of so many, without seeking the input of the contaminated? Is it ethical for those bureaucracies to make an agreement which potentially impacts every future case of contamination in the nation? Is it ethical, socially or politically, (in a democratic republic) for any bureaucracy to set such precedent? Is it legal in this democratic republic, for bureaucracies to determine the fate of so many? Isn’t it the responsibility of legislators, not bureaucracies, to pass legislation regarding such decisions? The question is, can this nation thrive by cannibalizing its patriots and allowing bureaucracies to set such precedent, when we have elected Congress People who should be making such decisions?

Rationalization provides a mechanism by which terrible events can be put behind an individual or society. The trouble with trying to rationalized the horror of Camp Lejeune is that there are so many survivors in so much pain. There is no ethical rationalization which can dispose of so many people or so much pain. This nation, its leaders and its citizens can try to rationalize Camp Lejeune’s horror, but it can’t be accomplished without undermining what this nation is all about. “Group think” can’t make the horror of Camp Lejeune go away because this nation is about the rights of the individual. Each individual in this nation has the right to pursue life, liberty and happiness. This nation can not visit death, pain and suffering on its patriots and expect to thrive, in the future. When any individual, in this nation, becomes expendable, the vision of our Founding Fathers becomes expendable. Why? Because the rights of the individual IS THE VISION of our Founding Fathers!

Navy Can't Explain Abandoned Wells

The Navy can't explain the reasons the base wells were abandoned, some within a few years of construction, the purchase of municipal water and resulting expenditure of millions of dollars.

MCAS El Toro is closed now, the base wells abandoned and destroyed. As a young Marine in the 1960s, I drank, showered, washed laundry, cleaned barracks, made coffee, and scrubbed pots and pans on mess duty with El Toro's water.

MCAS El Toro was commissioned on March 17, 1943. In 1942, the Irvine Ranch's lima bean field near the Canada Del Toro (Canyon of the Bull) was chosen as the site to relocate five Marine Carrier Groups from San Diego.

Construction of the air station began on August 3, 1942. By January 1943, the former bean field was turned into a Marine air station, complete with five asphalt runways, hangars, barracks, and a water distribution system. By 1945, the California State Military website http://www.militarymuseum.org/MCASElToro.html reported that El Toro "had grown to a station of 4,000 acres, 9.2 miles of roads, 660,000-sq. yd. of runways and taxiways, 139,281 sq. yd. of aircraft ramps, a 10-mile water system, and a 10-mile sewer system."

Fast forward to 1985. During a routine water well inspection, Orange County Water District employees discovered a Trichlorothylene (TCE) plume spreading from El Toro into the county's principal aquifer. The Agency for Toxic Substances Abuse (ATSDR) reported in 1993 that: "The maximum concentration of TCE was measured at a well approximately 1 mile beyond the station boundary at depths between 165 and 450 feet, (below land surface) and have been moving northwest at a rate of 4-30 feet per day, which is considerably greater than the 1-4 feet/day regional flow rate."

The very young and the old are especially vulnerable to the health effects of TCE exposure. The contamination of two water wells in Woburn, MA, made national attention in a best selling book and follow-on movie. John Travolta starred in "A Civil Action," a story of the legal fight for justice by parents of children exposed to TCE contaminated drinking water from Woburn's Wells G and H who died from lymphoblastic leukemia. The resulting civil suit against W.R. Grace/Cryovac Division and Beatrice Foods in 1982 was settled out of court.

Millions of dollars were spent by the Navy in the investigation and clean-up of the soil and groundwater on the base. TCE was used on the base for decades as an industrial solvent to degrease aircraft. No usage records were kept, but EPA estimated 8,000 pounds were in the base's soil and groundwater under Site 24, the highly industrialized area where the six of the base wells were located, too.

TCE waste products in the groundwater and soil from the southwest quadrant's highly industrialized area, slowly moved northwest with the groundwater flow into the Orange County principal aquifer. The TCE plume never penetrated the principal aquifer under the base, but did contaminate the shallow aquifer down to 260 feet below the ground surface (bgs).

Since the wells drew water from the deeper, uncontaminated principal aquifer, both the Navy and the EPA maintain there's no need for concern. However, the Navy did not take follow-up action on a consulting engineer's report of finding one well screen in the contaminated shallow aquifer, destroying the remaining wells without looking for their screens. Contaminants like TCE could enter the wells through well screens. There's no explanation from the Navy for this decision.

Six base water wells were constructed in 1942. Like other Orange County wells, the El Toro's base wells went deep into the principal aquifer. A Navy schematic showed well depths for the four of the six base wells ranging from 440 feet to 645 feet below the ground surface (bgs). These wells drew water from the principal aquifer under the base since the shallow aquifer's water was of poor quality due to elevated levels of total dissolved solids (TDS) from natural geology and nitrates from past agricultural practices. An intermediate zone of clay up to 100 feet thick separated the two
aquifers.

In April 1998 before its destruction, Well #4's well screen was found in the contaminated shallow aquifer. Other wells constructed at the same time were not inspected for the location of their wells screens, even though the original well construction drawings were missing and the wells were about to be destroyed. The Navy did exactly the right thing in locating the well screen for the first well destroyed, but failed to follow-up on the remaining wells. There is no explanation for not inspecting the other wells. With all six wells constructed at the same time, it's highly probable that the driller used the same technique to construct the other well screens. This risk is that any well screens in the contaminated aquifer would allow contaminants like TCE into the wells and the drinking water.

The Navy's consulting engineer reported that the well casing for Well #4 was "extremely corroded" and probably caused the well casing to collapse at 452 feet below the ground surface (bgs). The consulting engineer noted that the "impediment at 452 feet bgs suggested a failure in the well casing at 452 feet bgs, which allowed the formation material into the well," and "the water in the bailer was very black and opaque, and emitted a strong sulfurous odor." Because of the high turbidity in the well, no chemical analysis of the water was done (a chemical analysis several years before showed 12 ug/L of TCE). The well screen was found at 210 feet bgs, consisting of a vertical slots hand cut by torch and appeared to continue all the way to the bottom of the well (approximately 494 feet bgs). The shallow aquifer ran to about 260 feet bgs so about 50 feet of the well screen was in the contaminated aquifer.

In addition to TCE, well screens in the shallow aquifer would allow salts from elevated levels of total dissolved solids (TDS) into the wells. High levels of salts can cause service disruptions, expensive repairs and shortened a well's useful life.

The Irvine Desalter Potable Treatment Facility is located just outside the former base. This facility was built to remove salt from the groundwater flowing from the shallow aquifer under El Toro, using reverse osmosis to separate the salt from the water. The facility produces 2.7 million gallons per day of desalted water, enough drinking water each year for about 50,000 people www.irwd.com/WaterQuality/IDP/facilitites.php.

Salts from TDS greater than 1,000 mg/L may have been the justification for the Navy to purchase municipal water. Based on the information available from the Navy, it's reasonable to assume that all the wells were abandoned by January 1970, not because of TCE but from corrosion from salts.

We found one El Toro engineering drawing, Repairs to Wells and Pumping Equipment," date April 1948, which may indicate the corrosive effects of salts on the base wells. Five of the original six wells were on this drawing. Well #3 was not listed and Well #4 was shown as abandoned in April 1947. The extent of repairs to the wells and pumps was not documented. A copy of a Navy schematic provided to consulting engineers during the well destruction phase (1998-2007) showed well pumps for the four of the six wells located deep in the well. For example, for Well #2, the well depth went to 545 feet bgs and the pump was located at 359 feet bgs. Well screens in the shallow aquifer would have exposed the pumps to the corrosive effects of salts.

Chemical tests for TCE in the drinking water were not available until the mid-1980s. For anyone on the base prior to 1970, the risk of exposure to TCE from the well water is a possibility. Well screens in the lower shallow aquifer would not only have allowed salts into the wells, but a much more dangerous contaminant-TCE. As bad luck would have it, the TCE plume cut right through the base wells.

In February 1951, the Navy purchased "softened water" for both El Toro and the nearby Santa Ana Air Facility. Only a few details on this purchase are known. The Navy could not locate a copy of the early contract or any details justifying the reason for the purchase of municipal water.

A few lines from the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) Annual Report for 1951 confirmed the agreement to furnish "about one cubic foot per second of softened water" to serve both El Toro and the Air Facility." The Navy had no explanation for this purchase.

The Navy's position that the base wells were all abandoned by 1951 just doesn't make sense. In 1945, the new well were producing over 1,296,000 gallons/day. There is no evidence of any shortage in water from the principal aquifer. Did the Navy really abandon all the base wells before the MWD contract? While water wells are abandoned all the time for various reasons, our review suggests that the wells were abandoned but not by June 1951.

With no shortage of water in the aquifer, you have to wonder what caused the Navy to purchase municipal water. Water in California is not inexpensive. Millions of dollars were spent by El Toro over four decades to purchase water from two California water districts. At our request, Navy personnel searched files but were unable to find a justification for either purchase.

There is one possible explanation. By 1947, El Toro abandoned one well (Well #4) and another one (Well #3) was not in service as early as 1948. These wells were not put back in service. Neither of the wells was shown on El Toro engineering drawings from 1954. The Navy reported that "records from 1943 until 1950 showed the maximum combined flow from these six wells was 900 gallons per minute in August 1945." This turns about to be about 1,296,000 gallons/day. Abandoning two of the six wells would have meant lost capacity of about 432,000 gallons/day (1/3 x 1,260,000 gallons). In hindsight, it appears reasonable to conclude that the 1951 MWD purchase may have been done to make up for the lost output of these two wells.

The MWD contract provided for the delivery of one cubic foot/second of water for El Toro and the Santa Ana Air Facility. The United States Geological Survey defines cubic foot per second (cfs) as "the flow rate or discharge equal to one cubic foot of water per second or about 7.5 gallons per second." Converting the MWD's one cubic foot per second into gallons equals about 648,000 gallons/day for both installations (7.5 x 60 x 60 x 24).

While 648,000 gallons/day is a lot of water, it's a little less than 1/3 of the 2,016,000 gallons/day purchased by the Navy for El Toro (86%) and the Santa Ana Air Facility (14%) in 1969 from the Irvine Ranch Water District (IRWD). The increase in the water supply from the IRWD contract was supported by the construction of two additional water mains. The water supply from the 1951 MWD contract does not appear adequate to support El Toro's water needs without additional water from the base wells.

In fact, we did found evidence that base wells were part of El Toro's water distribution system after the MWD purchase. El Toro engineering drawings from 1954, for example, showed 4 of the 6 base wells as part the base's water distribution system. Wells #3 and #4 were not on the drawing. What happened to Well #3 remains a mystery to this day. Efforts to locate the well in the late 1990s were not successful.

It's clear by 1969 the Navy had no intention of using El Toro's wells. The IRWD contract stated that the El Toro wells were not to be used even in the event of a curtailment of water from a successful suit by the city of Santa Ana to challenge the IRWD annexation of property. In this event, IRWD agreed to make water from the Santa Ana Air Facility's base wells available to El Toro.

Knowing the corrosive effects of salts from the shallow aquifer, and the placement of well screens, the best thing that can be said about El Toro's wells was the decision to abandon them. They were just in the wrong place at the wrong time.

With TCE in the shallow aquifer, the risk of corrosion from salts, and the questions about the location of well screens, anyone drinking well water was at some risk for exposure to TCE. As late as 1995, a monitoring well (73W1071) on the base reported a TCE level 1,200 ug/L (155-160 feet bgs) or 240 times the EPA MCL. Knowing this, I doubt if there would be many volunteers lined up to drink the well water, even if it was available.

The Navy has no explanation for why the wells were abandoned. However, there's enough information to point to the salts in the shallow aquifer causing well and pump repairs, shortening their useful life, and forcing the decision to abandon the wells early and probably not later than January 1970.

The justification for 1969 NAVFAC/IRWD contract is in the official contract file. This contract likely remained in effect until the sale of El Toro in 2005. Care takers and fire service required water. Navy regulations require the retention of contract files until 6 years and 3 months after final payment. Based on my calculations, these records should be available until sometime in 2011, but a search by Navy personnel was unable to locate the
contract file.

On August 10, 2008, a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request was sent to the Navy, asking for copies of the justification for the IRWD contract. An October 2nd response from Navy BRAC West stated that "we were not able to locate supporting documents in our files for municipal water services contract N62473-68-C-2720 awarded July 1, 1969, nor were we able to locate any documents describing the need to purchase municipal water service for El Toro and any cost/benefits analysis vs. repair/construction of on-base wells." An appeal to the Navy General Counsel asking for his intervention to locate the contract file was denied.

We may never know the extent of TCE contamination of the base wells and the health effects on those who drank its water. But, we can be thankful for the "salt" in the shallow aquifer which appears to be the reason the wells were abandoned and the purchase of municipal water. Next time you put some salt on your food, say a prayer for those who drank the well water and didn't know.

DOD/VA to Review Environmental Exposure Policies


U.S. Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs asked the DOD and VA for information on the processes used to identify exposure to environmental toxins, notify veterans and adjudicate VA service-connection claims.

Senator Daniel Akaka, Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs, on October 2, 2008, asked fellow DOD/VA Senior Oversight Committee (SOC) members for information on how "DOD identifies locations where possible exposure to environmental toxins took place, what steps DOD is taking to identify individuals who may have been exposed to such hazards, how information on such exposures is transmitted to VA, and what policies and procedures VA has in place to ensue that relevant information is used for adjudication of claims for service-connection based on environmental toxin exposure."

Most folks would be concerned if they learned their neighborhood had thousands of pounds of toxic chemicals in its soil and groundwater, resulting in a toxic plume spreading into the nearby county and threatening the local water supply.

There’s no question that this news would be of concern to any community, especially when the “neighborhood” was classified as an EPA Superfund site. Imagine the impact on real estate values, let alone the potential health effects to humans.

In the 1960s, my “neighborhood” was Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California. Like thousands of other veterans, I was never notified by the government that MCAS El Toro was classified as an EPA Superfund Site from the contamination of the soil and groundwater by environmental toxins. Nor did the government make any attempt to advise me of the potential health effects of exposure to these contaminants.

You expect this kind of treatment when buying a used car, but it comes as a shock to learn that the government accepts no responsibility to notify any veteran or dependent when a military base is classified as an EPA Superfund site.

Email sent to Senator Akaka

I have no idea if the VA/DOD review will be beneficial to veterans or is just another bureaucratic exercise. Not knowing Senator Akaka, I thought I would at least give him the benefit of doubt. I sent the following email to Senator Akaka at http://www.senate.gov/~veterans/public/index.cfm?pageid=1 and encourage other veterans and dependents to do the same:

"I am writing in reference to the contamination of the soil and groundwater of MCAS El Toro, California with TCE/PCE and other VOCs.

As you may know, former MCAS El Toro was an EPA Superfund site, on the Navy’s 1993 BRAC list, closed in July 1999 and much of the base sold by the Navy at a public auction in 2005 for $650 million.

EPA reported an estimated 8,000 pounds of TCE in the soil and groundwater of Marine Wing Services Group-37, the source of the TCE plume spreading into Orange County and my duty assignment for two years in the 1960s. Last year I was surprised to learn of El Toro’s placement on the Superfund list and even more surprised to learn that Bldg. 296—a huge maintenance hangar and my work station—was the primary source of the TCE plume.

The government didn’t notify me of El Toro’s TCE/PCE contamination and my possible exposure to these toxic chemicals and their health effects. By pure change, I discovered during an internet search that a national law firm was advertising for clients injured by El Toro’s pollution.

I think you'll agree that the government owed me at least a "heads-up." After talking with my urologist, I learned of the link between TCE/PCE exposure and bladder cancer. I underwent bladder cancer surgery in December 2005, followed by chemotherapy in 2006. Diagnosed with stage 2/3 bladder cancer, I’m fortunate to be alive. There also appears to be a connection between my over active pituitary gland, prostate growth, and exposure to TCE/PCE at El Toro.

Over the last year, I’ve learned that chemical exposure can occur through dermal contact, ingestion, and inhalation. Following this trail, I contacted the Navy BRAC San Diego, EPA Region 9, San Francisco, and ATSDR, Atlanta to determine if there was a possibility that my service at El Toro caused my illnesses. It’s been an interesting journey.

ATSDR advised me that inhalation of TCE/PCE vapors in the hangar was a likely exposure route. I asked both the Navy and EPA about the water supply on the base. Both agencies assured me there was no need for concern with the “historical wells” since all the wells drew water from the uncontaminated principal aquifer.

To understand what happened to the wells, I contacted the Orange County Health Agency to obtain copies of the consulting engineers’ well destruction reports. Another surprise. The very first well destroyed by the Navy in 1998 was Well #4. The consulting engineer found 25 ug/L of TCE in the well and the video tape showed a continuous well screen from 210 feet bgs. This meant that 50 feet of the well screen was in the shallow, contaminated aquifer.

NAVFAC San Diego awarded the well destruction contracts and wrote the instructions to follow on the well destruction permits. Apparently, NAVFAC was surprised to learn of the location of the well screen, too. NAVFAC stopped asking their consulting engineers to look for the well screens on the remaining base wells. Since the original well construction drawings and driller’s logs from 1942 are missing, only a physical inspection of the well would determine the location of the well screen. The well screen is important since this is the first point that water and contaminants enter the well. All of the base wells are now destroyed.

After learning what happened to the well screen, my curiosity was raised and I made queries about the purchase of municipal water for El Toro. The Navy BRAC in San Diego advised me that there was no evidence of use of the base wells after the purchase of municipal water from the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) in June 1951. There was no explanation from the Navy for the purchase of water from MWD or a copy of the contract. I understood that the Navy would not purchase municipal water without good reason so I continued to look for an explanation of what happened and the dates the base wells were abandoned.

The Navy BRAC did give me a page from a 1951 MWD Annual Report. This report showed that MWD agreed to supply one cubic foot/second of “softened water” to both El Toro and the nearby Santa Ana Air Facility. Well, this turns out to be a lot of water (646,000 gallons/day), but not enough to meet the demand requirements for both bases and less than 1/3 of the supply (2,016,000 gallons/day) from a follow-on contact with the Irvine Ranch Water District in 1969.

Based on the existence of El Toro engineering drawings from 1954 and the relatively low volume of water supplied by the MWD contract, my guess is that the wells were abandoned later in time. THIS IS IMPORTANT TO MARINE VETERANS AND DEPENDENTS SINCE THE TCE PLUME CUT ITS PATH RIGHT THROUGH THE BASE WELLS. TCE and other contaminants could easily enter wells through wells screens in the shallow aquifer or from corrosion in the well casings.

DOD should be required to notify veterans of their possible exposure to environmental toxins and their health effects whenever a military base is contaminated with these toxins. The Navy is now doing this for Camp Lejeune Marine veterans, but only after legislation was enacted.

TCE contamination is widespread in many military bases. Dr. Thomas Sinks, Deputy Director, ATSDR, in his testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Energy and Commerce, on June 12, 2007, identified serious health effects caused by occupational exposure to TCE and PCE.


Dr. Sinks stated that:"Occupational exposure to TCE may cause nervous system effects, kidney, liver and lung damage, abnormal heartbeat, coma, and possibly death. Occupational exposure to TCE also has been associated with adult cancers such as kidney cancer, liver and biliary cancer, and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. TCE in drinking water has been associated with childhood leukemia in two studies and with specific birth defects such as neural tube defects and oral clefts in one study. Exposure to PCE-contaminated drinking water has been linked with adult cancers such as non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, leukemia, bladder cancer, and breast cancer."

"A Few Good Men, Lots of Chemicals"

Camp Lejeune’s "The Few, The Proud, The Forgotten" website adds link for MCAS El Toro Marines veterans. Attempts to learn more about the exposure of El Toro Marines to toxic chemicals continue.

Former MCAS El Toro could be used as a movie script for the “perfect environmental crime.” Dump 8,000 pounds of TCE and other goodies into the soil and groundwater; watch a mostly TCE plume go through the area of the base wells into Orange county; put the base on the BRAC hit list; lose documentation; put thousands of acres up for sale; and pocket $650 million from the sale to a land developer. In this case, the victims are mostly “invisible Marine veterans,” who have no clue of what hit ‘em.

We’re a long way from understanding the extent of exposure of Marines at El Toro to TCE/PCE and other contaminants. This would be a “cold case,” if it were not for the efforts of a few El Toro veterans who refuse to accept the government’s “don’t worry; there’s not need for concern.”

The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) is attempting to locate documentation to determine the risk of exposure to TCE/PCE for El Toro Marines.

ATSDR, located in Atlanta, GA, is responsible for performing public health assessments of Superfund sites like MCAS El Toro. At the request of a number of El Toro veterans, ATSDR is attempting to locate documentation to determine the risk of exposure to TCE/PCE for El Toro Marines, dependents, and civilian workers. This is not going to be an easy job. I don’t envy these professionals.

ATSDR completed a public health assessment of MCAS El Toro in March 1991. The findings were indeterminate: ATSDR reported in April 1993 that “based on the evaluation of available data and on current site conditions at the El Toro Marine Corps Air Station, follow-up public health actions are not being considered at this time. As more data become available, ATSDR will evaluate the data to determine if public health actions are indicated for the community near the site.”

In a nutshell, El Toro didn’t have enough data for ATSDR to make any assessment of the impact on public health. The lack of data seems to be a recurring theme at El Toro.

In 1985, Orange County Water District employees found TCE off-base during a routine well inspection. It took some time to identify the source of the TCE plume. The source of the TCE plume was traced to the southwest quadrant of the base, the 200 acres occupied by MWSG-37, but not until after completion of the ATSDR public health assessment. This area was classified as EPA Site 24.

My guess is that the Navy and Marine Corps will not welcome ATSDR's inquiries with open arms. Both Camp Lejeune, the home of the 2nd Marine Division, and MCAS El Toro, the home of the 3rd MAW until July 1999, were affected by TCE contamination. The Marine Corps acknowledges the contamination of well water at Camp Lejeune between 1957 and 1987. At El Toro, a one-time EPA Superfund site, the Navy was responsible for the clean-up of contaminants. Citing the lack of evidence of use of the base wells after 1951, the Navy's position is that there's no need to be concerned about contamination of the El Toro’s wells. There are good reasons to dispute this conclusion.

The closure of MCAS El Toro in July 1999 makes it very difficult to obtain copies of documents, even with the use of FOIA. Federal record retention requirements establish the time limits for retention of files and mandate their destruction at a specified point in time. The search for documentation is not like drinking vintage wine. It just doesn’t get better with age. For example, there’s no MCAS El Toro Public Works Dept. to contact, only a Navy BRAC office not particularly interested in helping Marine veterans determine their exposure to TCE/PCE chemicals.

No Federal agency has addressed the risk of exposure to TCE/PCE at El Toro from inhalation and dermal contact. For those Marines who worked with TCE/PCE or in areas where these chemicals were routinely used is an obvious risk.

Drinking TCE/PCE contaminated water is a common route of exposure to carcinogens. El Toro’s wells (6 out of 8) were in the path of the TCE plume. This should have been a “red flag” to any investigator, but there’s only the Navy’s reply that “there’s no evidence of use of the base wells after 1951.” Not terribly reassuring to anyone stationed at El Toro, especially when there’s no usage records of TCE/PCE for the base and too many records are missing (e.g., well construction drawings, pumping records, dates abandoned, repair records).

The Navy purchase of municipal water does not mean the base wells were completely abandoned. There’s no explanation from the Navy for the expenditure of millions of dollars to purchase municipal water. Nor, is there any explanation of why El Toro’s water distribution system shows 4 of the 6 wells and pump houses in the path of the TCE plume years after the initial purchase of municipal water. Only one well was ever marked as abandoned on engineering drawings of the water distribution system. The increase in municipal water purchase in 1969 would have allowed El Toro to abandon these wells. When were the base wells abandoned is the "million dollar question."

We know the dates the base wells were destroyed, the unsettling knowledge that the first well destroyed (AW #4) had 50 feet of its well screen in the shallow, contaminated aquifer; the Navy made no attempts to look for other well screens after AW #4; the extensive well corrosion found by consulting engineers during well destruction (1998-2007); the high levels of total dissolved solids (“salts”) in the shallow aquifer increased the risk of corrosion; and the reports from El Toro veterans with illnesses linked to TCE/PCE exposure.

We need to continue to "spread the word" to other El Toro Marine veterans and dependents of the base's TCE/PCE contamination. There's no magic pill for TCE/PCE exposure, but knowing the health affects of TCE/PCE exposure may alert others to seek prompt medical attention and save lives.

Marine and dependents associated with two Camp Lejeune websites have been especially helpful in spreading the news of El Toro's TCE/PCE contamination. Just this week the "The Few, The Proud, The Forgotten," (http://www.tftptf.com/136645.html) added a link to this bog and a synopsis of El Toro's contamination. Also, the veterans and dependents from the Lejeune STAND (http://www.watersurvivors.com) continue to show their willingness to offer advice and assistance to El Toro Marines and dependents. It's always comforting to know that other Marines "have your back."

El Toro's Wells Still Suspect

The Navy reported the purchase of municipal water from two municipal water districts and "no evidence" of the use of El Toro’s wells after the purchases. A major TCE plume went through the area of the base wells. An El Toro Public Works Department drawing showed 4 of the 6 base wells as part of the base's water distribution system after the initial purchase.

MCAS El Toro is closed now; the base wells abandoned and destroyed. For over 50 years, the Navy spent millions to purchase water for El Toro and the nearby Santa Ana Air Facility. The Navy can't explain why the water was purchased or the reasons the base wells were abandoned. With one exception, the dates the wells were abandoned are unknown. The integrity of the wells and the dates abandoned are important since the wells were located in the path of trichloroethylene plume.

MCAS El Toro was commissioned in March 1943. Six base wells were constructed in the southwest quadrant of the base. The wells went deep into the principal aquifer under the base, avoiding the shallow aquifer’s poor water quality.

In 1951, the Navy awarded a contract to the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) for municipal water services for both El Toro and the Santa Ana Air Facility. In 1969, the Navy, as a result of property annexation, awarded a municipal water services contract to the Irvine Ranch Water District (IRWD).

The reasons for the purchase of municipal water are unknown. The Navy contends that well corrosion was not a factor despite the high levels of TDS ("salts") in the shallow aquifer. The only thing that is certain is that the Navy did not purchase municipal water without cause, especially when there was good quality water in the principal aquifer under the base.

In 1985 the Orange County Water District discovered a TCE plume spreading off of El Toro into Orange County's principal aquifer. Several years later, El Toro was placed on the EPA Superfund list. The source of the TCE plume was traced to the MWSG-37 area (EPA Site 24); the base wells were located there, too.

El Toro's wells were less than ten years old when the MWD contract was awarded by the Navy. Evidence suggests that not all of the base wells were abandoned in 1951. A 1954 El Toro Public Works Department drawing showed 4 of the 6 wells as part of the base's water distribution system. Except for one well abandoned in 1947, there's no record of the dates the other wells were abandoned.

All of El Toro's wells are now destroyed, the last one in 2007. NAVFAC Southwest directed the destruction of El Toro's wells. The work was done by consulting engineers and drillers under contract from 1998 to 2007. Well destruction permits were obtained from the Orange County Health Agency. NAVFAC described the methods of destruction for each well on the permit.

This was not an easy task for the consulting engineers and drillers since the well construction drawings were missing. Physical inspection of well casings revealed extensive corrosion, broken discharge pipes inside of casings, and at least one well failure.

The destruction work followed the California Department of Water Resource guidelines. For the first well destroyed, the consultant found 50 feet of the well screen in the contaminated shallow aquifer. In fact, the consulting engineer found TCE in excess of EPA’s MCL in the bottom of the well even though it was abandoned in 1947. After the first well destruction, NAVFAC never directed its consultants to look for another well screen.

There’s no regulatory requirement to locate well screens when destroying water wells. But, when you have evidence of a misplaced well screen in a contaminated aquifer, missing construction drawings and other wells in the same aquifer, there's no logical reason not to look for them.

The obvious risk is that well driller in 1942 may have placed other screens in the shallow aquifer. A much greater risk is exposure to TCE in well water. The TCE plume went through the area of the base wells so any other well screens in the shallow aquifer would have allowed TCE into the wells. We don’t know if this happened.

We do know that the shallow aquifer was unsuitable for drinking water because of high levels of TDS and nitrates. The only thing for sure is now is that all the wells are buried in concrete and no one knows if the well driller in 1942 in a hurry to construct the wells just made one mistake or a series of them.

The high levels of TDS in the shallow aquifer put the base wells at some risk of corrosion. “Hard water” or water with elevated levels of TDS can corrode pipes, water heaters, and drinking wells. The Navy disputes any evidence of corrosion, despite consulting engineers' well destruction reports of extensive corrosion in the well casings, the steel pipe installed while drilling the wells to prevent collapse of the well bore hole and the entrance of contaminants, and to allow placement of a pump or pumping equipment.

TDS are primarily minerals/salts. The more minerals dissolved into the water the higher the total dissolved solids. For drinking water a limit of 500 mg/L is desirable. At El Toro, the levels of TDS in the shallow aquifer are greater than 1,000 mg/L. The levels are so high that millions of dollars were spent to build the Irvine Desalter Project, a treatment facility just outside the former base, to remove TDS flowing from the shallow aquifer’s brackish water and treat the TCE plume.

In 1951, the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) agreed to furnish “about one cubic foot per second of softened water” to serve both El Toro and the Air Facility. Converting this unit of measure into gallons equals about 450 gallons/minute for both installations. While this is a lot of water, it is about half of the maximum daily output of El Toro's base wells alone. Based on the relatively low quantity of water supplied by MWD and the age of the wells (only nine years since their construction), the odds favor the need to increase the supply of "softened" water without abandoning the base wells.

The Navy found "no evidence of well casing failure or any information indicating the continued potable or non-potable use of MCAS El Toro wells subsequent to the connection to the MWD water supply main." Simply put, the Navy's position is that the wells were not used after June 1951. Yet, there's evidence that some of the wells were operating after 1951.

A 1954 El Toro Public Works drawing "Modifications to the MWD Water Supply Line Location Plan" lists 4 of the original 6 wells as part of water distribution system. For the remaining two wells, one is shown as a dry hole (#3) and the other as abandoned (#4).

Could elevated levels of TDS in the shallow aquifer caused serious well corrosion, shortened their useful life, and forced the decision to abandon the wells? Maybe. By 1951, the Navy is shopping to purchase municipal water. Something had to be wrong with the base wells for the Navy to purchase municipal water.

In 1969, the Navy's municipal water services contract with the IRWD estimated the daily demand at 1,700,000 gallons for El Toro. This was an increase in the water supply requirements above the maximum daily output from the base wells and may have allowed the base to abandon the wells.

The IRWD contract file may also indicate the reasons the base wells were abandoned and the need to continue the municipal water services for El Toro.

By 1969, there's evidence that El Toro's wells were not to be used even in the event of a disruption in water services. The 1969 IRWD contract required that the wells at the Marine Corps Air Facility be used to support El Toro in the event of disruption in water services resulting from a legal challenge to IRWD's annexation of property.

This IRWD contract remained in effect until the sale of El Toro in 2005. Navy regulations require the retention of contract files until 6 years and 3 months after final payment. Based on my calculations, these records should be available until sometime in 2011.

On August 10th, a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request was sent to the Navy asking for copies of the justification for the IRWD contract. An October 2nd response from the Navy stated that they were unable to locate supporting documents for the IRWD contract, including any documents describing the need to purchase municipal water service for El Toro.

An appeal to the Navy General Counsel asking for his intervention to locate the contract file was filed this week. Once the IRWD contract file is found, maybe we'll all know the answer to this puzzle.

Presumptive Disability for TCE Veterans

VA policy puts the burden of proof on veterans to provide extensive supporting documentation for disability compensation claims for TCE exposure, even when veterans have been stationed at contaminated military sites and the illness is linked to TCE exposure.

Government reports show that many military bases have elevated levels of Trichloroethylene (TCE)—a toxic chemical linked to cancer and other serious illnesses.

A 2003 Air Force Pentagon report estimated that there were 1,400 TCE-contaminated military sites. Former Marine Corps Air Station El Toro is one of those bases.

At MCAS El Toro, EPA estimated that the source area of the TCE plume spreading into Orange County had an estimated 8,000 pounds of TCE in the soil and groundwater. No question that Marines working in this area were at risk of exposure to TCE.

A major problem for sick veterans who were stationed at El Toro and other military bases with TCE contamination is the VA requirement to obtain proof that their disability was due to military service.

The VA denies disability claims of veterans without substantial supporting documentation, including an opinion from a medical doctor that the illness was “at least as likely as not” due to exposure to TCE in the military.

For many veterans this is a “catch twenty-two situation.” The military base they were stationed at has high levels of TCE. Their illness is one that can be caused by exposure to TCE. They can’t work because of their disability. The VA requires “proof” that their disability including a medical opinion that the illness was linked to military service.

The veteran now out of work because of the disability must obtain substantial supporting documentation linking the disability to military service (the VA calls this a “nexus” statement). If you bet the veteran does not have the money to pay for the VA’s proof requirements, the odds are in your favor.

A call to a California medical doctor and toxicologist who specializes in this area showed that a one page opinion letter would cost about $3,000, assuming only a quick review of the medical documentation. The opinion letter came without any guarantees.

There’s a better way for veterans who are seriously ill from TCE exposure. VA disability claims for veterans who have diseases linked with TCE exposure can be resolved by given them "presumptive disability" entitlement.

The VA’s Presumptive Disability entitlement eliminates the need for an expensive medical nexus statement. How does "presumptive entitlement" work? If one of the medical conditions linked to TCE exposure is diagnosed in a veteran and the veteran served in a location contaminated with TCE, the VA presumes that the circumstances of his/her service caused the condition, and disability compensation could be awarded.

The VA has four groups of veterans under the Presumptive Disability category. These include former POWs, Vietnam veterans (exposed to Agent Orange); atomic veterans (exposed to ionizing radiation); and Gulf War veterans.

There’s medical support of the heath affects of TCE exposure (including the EPA and the National Academy of Sciences). TCE was a widely used chemical by the military for decades, many bases have documented TCE contamination, and many veterans were exposed to this carcinogen and suffer the effects of exposure.

In 2001, EPA reported TCE exposure associated with neurotoxicity, immunotoxicity, developmental toxicity, liver toxicity, kidney toxicity, endocrine effects, and several forms of cancer.

Without presumptive disability entitlement, a disabled cancer veteran who was exposed to TCE in the military at one of the 1,400 contaminated military sites needs to pay for a medical doctor’s review and opinion linking the cancer to military service, obtain copies of all medical records, file a disability claim, wait months if not years for a decision, and be prepared to appeal a denial. Assuming the veteran lives that long, the cost can easily run into thousands of dollars. HMOs do not pay for VA nexus statements.

Veterans, who are sick with cancer, can't work, and many with limited assets do not have the means to pay for highly skilled medical professionals. Failing to provide the nexus statement from an expert will cause the disability claim to be denied. Sadly, that happens more often than not. There's a better way to repay those who served our country.

I have no idea of total cost to the government for including TCE exposed veterans under the presumptive disability category. As a stage 2/3 bladder cancer survivor and El Toro Marine veteran, I have some idea of the cost to a veteran of not doing this. I have medical coverage so all of my operations and chemotherapy were paid for. Others are not so fortunate. I also have the means and the skills to find an expert medical practitioner who can write a nexus medical opinion to support a VA disability compensation claim. Others are not so fortunate. I have the funds to pay several hundred dollars per month for prescription drugs. Others are not so fortunate. I could go on and on but you get the idea.

It's not feasible to wave a magic wand to remove all of the TCE contaminants from military installations or to cure the health affects of exposure to military personnel and in many cases their dependents. Since we can't make a miracle happen, why not at least compensate those affected by exposure by including them in the VA's Presumptive Entitlement Disability category?

The VA is not going to wake-up tomorrow morning and realize the necessity of approving Presumptive Disability for TCE exposure. Congressional support is needed to make this change.

For example, at Camp Lejeune thousands of veterans were exposed to TCE contaminated water for decades. Only two veterans filed successful VA disability compensation cases and those were approved after appeals.

Why not take a few minutes to email your representative to ask that TCE exposed veterans be included under the VA's Presumptive Disability category? See http://www.visi.com/juan/congress/.