Navy Can't Explain Abandoned Wells
The Navy can't explain the reasons the base wells were abandoned, some within a few years of construction, the purchase of municipal water and resulting expenditure of millions of dollars.
MCAS El Toro is closed now, the base wells abandoned and destroyed. As a young Marine in the 1960s, I drank, showered, washed laundry, cleaned barracks, made coffee, and scrubbed pots and pans on mess duty with El Toro's water.
MCAS El Toro was commissioned on March 17, 1943. In 1942, the Irvine Ranch's lima bean field near the Canada Del Toro (Canyon of the Bull) was chosen as the site to relocate five Marine Carrier Groups from San Diego.
Construction of the air station began on August 3, 1942. By January 1943, the former bean field was turned into a Marine air station, complete with five asphalt runways, hangars, barracks, and a water distribution system. By 1945, the California State Military website http://www.militarymuseum.org/MCASElToro.html reported that El Toro "had grown to a station of 4,000 acres, 9.2 miles of roads, 660,000-sq. yd. of runways and taxiways, 139,281 sq. yd. of aircraft ramps, a 10-mile water system, and a 10-mile sewer system."
Fast forward to 1985. During a routine water well inspection, Orange County Water District employees discovered a Trichlorothylene (TCE) plume spreading from El Toro into the county's principal aquifer. The Agency for Toxic Substances Abuse (ATSDR) reported in 1993 that: "The maximum concentration of TCE was measured at a well approximately 1 mile beyond the station boundary at depths between 165 and 450 feet, (below land surface) and have been moving northwest at a rate of 4-30 feet per day, which is considerably greater than the 1-4 feet/day regional flow rate."
The very young and the old are especially vulnerable to the health effects of TCE exposure. The contamination of two water wells in Woburn, MA, made national attention in a best selling book and follow-on movie. John Travolta starred in "A Civil Action," a story of the legal fight for justice by parents of children exposed to TCE contaminated drinking water from Woburn's Wells G and H who died from lymphoblastic leukemia. The resulting civil suit against W.R. Grace/Cryovac Division and Beatrice Foods in 1982 was settled out of court.
Millions of dollars were spent by the Navy in the investigation and clean-up of the soil and groundwater on the base. TCE was used on the base for decades as an industrial solvent to degrease aircraft. No usage records were kept, but EPA estimated 8,000 pounds were in the base's soil and groundwater under Site 24, the highly industrialized area where the six of the base wells were located, too.
TCE waste products in the groundwater and soil from the southwest quadrant's highly industrialized area, slowly moved northwest with the groundwater flow into the Orange County principal aquifer. The TCE plume never penetrated the principal aquifer under the base, but did contaminate the shallow aquifer down to 260 feet below the ground surface (bgs).
Since the wells drew water from the deeper, uncontaminated principal aquifer, both the Navy and the EPA maintain there's no need for concern. However, the Navy did not take follow-up action on a consulting engineer's report of finding one well screen in the contaminated shallow aquifer, destroying the remaining wells without looking for their screens. Contaminants like TCE could enter the wells through well screens. There's no explanation from the Navy for this decision.
Six base water wells were constructed in 1942. Like other Orange County wells, the El Toro's base wells went deep into the principal aquifer. A Navy schematic showed well depths for the four of the six base wells ranging from 440 feet to 645 feet below the ground surface (bgs). These wells drew water from the principal aquifer under the base since the shallow aquifer's water was of poor quality due to elevated levels of total dissolved solids (TDS) from natural geology and nitrates from past agricultural practices. An intermediate zone of clay up to 100 feet thick separated the two
aquifers.
In April 1998 before its destruction, Well #4's well screen was found in the contaminated shallow aquifer. Other wells constructed at the same time were not inspected for the location of their wells screens, even though the original well construction drawings were missing and the wells were about to be destroyed. The Navy did exactly the right thing in locating the well screen for the first well destroyed, but failed to follow-up on the remaining wells. There is no explanation for not inspecting the other wells. With all six wells constructed at the same time, it's highly probable that the driller used the same technique to construct the other well screens. This risk is that any well screens in the contaminated aquifer would allow contaminants like TCE into the wells and the drinking water.
The Navy's consulting engineer reported that the well casing for Well #4 was "extremely corroded" and probably caused the well casing to collapse at 452 feet below the ground surface (bgs). The consulting engineer noted that the "impediment at 452 feet bgs suggested a failure in the well casing at 452 feet bgs, which allowed the formation material into the well," and "the water in the bailer was very black and opaque, and emitted a strong sulfurous odor." Because of the high turbidity in the well, no chemical analysis of the water was done (a chemical analysis several years before showed 12 ug/L of TCE). The well screen was found at 210 feet bgs, consisting of a vertical slots hand cut by torch and appeared to continue all the way to the bottom of the well (approximately 494 feet bgs). The shallow aquifer ran to about 260 feet bgs so about 50 feet of the well screen was in the contaminated aquifer.
In addition to TCE, well screens in the shallow aquifer would allow salts from elevated levels of total dissolved solids (TDS) into the wells. High levels of salts can cause service disruptions, expensive repairs and shortened a well's useful life.
The Irvine Desalter Potable Treatment Facility is located just outside the former base. This facility was built to remove salt from the groundwater flowing from the shallow aquifer under El Toro, using reverse osmosis to separate the salt from the water. The facility produces 2.7 million gallons per day of desalted water, enough drinking water each year for about 50,000 people www.irwd.com/WaterQuality/IDP/facilitites.php.
Salts from TDS greater than 1,000 mg/L may have been the justification for the Navy to purchase municipal water. Based on the information available from the Navy, it's reasonable to assume that all the wells were abandoned by January 1970, not because of TCE but from corrosion from salts.
We found one El Toro engineering drawing, Repairs to Wells and Pumping Equipment," date April 1948, which may indicate the corrosive effects of salts on the base wells. Five of the original six wells were on this drawing. Well #3 was not listed and Well #4 was shown as abandoned in April 1947. The extent of repairs to the wells and pumps was not documented. A copy of a Navy schematic provided to consulting engineers during the well destruction phase (1998-2007) showed well pumps for the four of the six wells located deep in the well. For example, for Well #2, the well depth went to 545 feet bgs and the pump was located at 359 feet bgs. Well screens in the shallow aquifer would have exposed the pumps to the corrosive effects of salts.
Chemical tests for TCE in the drinking water were not available until the mid-1980s. For anyone on the base prior to 1970, the risk of exposure to TCE from the well water is a possibility. Well screens in the lower shallow aquifer would not only have allowed salts into the wells, but a much more dangerous contaminant-TCE. As bad luck would have it, the TCE plume cut right through the base wells.
In February 1951, the Navy purchased "softened water" for both El Toro and the nearby Santa Ana Air Facility. Only a few details on this purchase are known. The Navy could not locate a copy of the early contract or any details justifying the reason for the purchase of municipal water.
A few lines from the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) Annual Report for 1951 confirmed the agreement to furnish "about one cubic foot per second of softened water" to serve both El Toro and the Air Facility." The Navy had no explanation for this purchase.
The Navy's position that the base wells were all abandoned by 1951 just doesn't make sense. In 1945, the new well were producing over 1,296,000 gallons/day. There is no evidence of any shortage in water from the principal aquifer. Did the Navy really abandon all the base wells before the MWD contract? While water wells are abandoned all the time for various reasons, our review suggests that the wells were abandoned but not by June 1951.
With no shortage of water in the aquifer, you have to wonder what caused the Navy to purchase municipal water. Water in California is not inexpensive. Millions of dollars were spent by El Toro over four decades to purchase water from two California water districts. At our request, Navy personnel searched files but were unable to find a justification for either purchase.
There is one possible explanation. By 1947, El Toro abandoned one well (Well #4) and another one (Well #3) was not in service as early as 1948. These wells were not put back in service. Neither of the wells was shown on El Toro engineering drawings from 1954. The Navy reported that "records from 1943 until 1950 showed the maximum combined flow from these six wells was 900 gallons per minute in August 1945." This turns about to be about 1,296,000 gallons/day. Abandoning two of the six wells would have meant lost capacity of about 432,000 gallons/day (1/3 x 1,260,000 gallons). In hindsight, it appears reasonable to conclude that the 1951 MWD purchase may have been done to make up for the lost output of these two wells.
The MWD contract provided for the delivery of one cubic foot/second of water for El Toro and the Santa Ana Air Facility. The United States Geological Survey defines cubic foot per second (cfs) as "the flow rate or discharge equal to one cubic foot of water per second or about 7.5 gallons per second." Converting the MWD's one cubic foot per second into gallons equals about 648,000 gallons/day for both installations (7.5 x 60 x 60 x 24).
While 648,000 gallons/day is a lot of water, it's a little less than 1/3 of the 2,016,000 gallons/day purchased by the Navy for El Toro (86%) and the Santa Ana Air Facility (14%) in 1969 from the Irvine Ranch Water District (IRWD). The increase in the water supply from the IRWD contract was supported by the construction of two additional water mains. The water supply from the 1951 MWD contract does not appear adequate to support El Toro's water needs without additional water from the base wells.
In fact, we did found evidence that base wells were part of El Toro's water distribution system after the MWD purchase. El Toro engineering drawings from 1954, for example, showed 4 of the 6 base wells as part the base's water distribution system. Wells #3 and #4 were not on the drawing. What happened to Well #3 remains a mystery to this day. Efforts to locate the well in the late 1990s were not successful.
It's clear by 1969 the Navy had no intention of using El Toro's wells. The IRWD contract stated that the El Toro wells were not to be used even in the event of a curtailment of water from a successful suit by the city of Santa Ana to challenge the IRWD annexation of property. In this event, IRWD agreed to make water from the Santa Ana Air Facility's base wells available to El Toro.
Knowing the corrosive effects of salts from the shallow aquifer, and the placement of well screens, the best thing that can be said about El Toro's wells was the decision to abandon them. They were just in the wrong place at the wrong time.
With TCE in the shallow aquifer, the risk of corrosion from salts, and the questions about the location of well screens, anyone drinking well water was at some risk for exposure to TCE. As late as 1995, a monitoring well (73W1071) on the base reported a TCE level 1,200 ug/L (155-160 feet bgs) or 240 times the EPA MCL. Knowing this, I doubt if there would be many volunteers lined up to drink the well water, even if it was available.
The Navy has no explanation for why the wells were abandoned. However, there's enough information to point to the salts in the shallow aquifer causing well and pump repairs, shortening their useful life, and forcing the decision to abandon the wells early and probably not later than January 1970.
The justification for 1969 NAVFAC/IRWD contract is in the official contract file. This contract likely remained in effect until the sale of El Toro in 2005. Care takers and fire service required water. Navy regulations require the retention of contract files until 6 years and 3 months after final payment. Based on my calculations, these records should be available until sometime in 2011, but a search by Navy personnel was unable to locate the
contract file.
On August 10, 2008, a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request was sent to the Navy, asking for copies of the justification for the IRWD contract. An October 2nd response from Navy BRAC West stated that "we were not able to locate supporting documents in our files for municipal water services contract N62473-68-C-2720 awarded July 1, 1969, nor were we able to locate any documents describing the need to purchase municipal water service for El Toro and any cost/benefits analysis vs. repair/construction of on-base wells." An appeal to the Navy General Counsel asking for his intervention to locate the contract file was denied.
We may never know the extent of TCE contamination of the base wells and the health effects on those who drank its water. But, we can be thankful for the "salt" in the shallow aquifer which appears to be the reason the wells were abandoned and the purchase of municipal water. Next time you put some salt on your food, say a prayer for those who drank the well water and didn't know.